Tracing International Migration in Projections of Income and Inequality Across the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways by Benveniste, Helene et al.
Tracing international migration in projections
of income and inequality across the Shared
Socioeconomic Pathways
Hélène Benveniste1,2 & Jesús Crespo Cuaresma1,3,4,5 & Matthew Gidden1,6 &
Raya Muttarak1,4
Received: 30 September 2020 /Accepted: 24 May 2021/
# The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) represent five narratives of future develop-
ment used for climate change research. They include quantified projections of socioeco-
nomic variables such as population, income levels, inequalities, and emissions over the
twenty-first century. The SSP’s population projections embody explicit, pathway-specific
international migration assumptions, which are only implicit in the projections of other
variables. In this contribution, we explicitly quantify the effects of international migration
on income levels and income inequality across and within countries by comparing the
original SSP projections to scenarios of zero migration. Income projections without
migration are obtained by removing two effects of migration on income dynamics:
changes in population size and remittances sent to origin countries. We base our
remittance estimates on migrant stocks derived from bilateral migration flow estimates
obtained from a gravity model. We find that, on average, migration tends to make the
world richer in all SSP narratives. The nature of migration and remittance corridors is
shaped by the specific scenario of future development considered. Depending on the
particular SSP narrative and world region considered, the effects of migration on income
can be substantial, ranging from −5 to +21% at the continental level. We show that
migration tends to decrease income inequality across countries and within country in
most destination countries but does not affect within-country inequality in origin coun-
tries. This new set of projections is consistent with the interdisciplinary framework of the
SSPs, which makes it particularly useful for assessing global climate and sustainable
development policy options.
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1 Introduction
Migration decisions are often multi-causal and environmental stress is merely one of many
underlying drivers of migration. Environmental change is likely to influence migration through
various economic, political, social, demographic, and environmental channels (Black et al.
2011a, b). Both extreme weather events, whose intensity is expected to increase in the future,
and slow-onset events (e.g., droughts, sea-level rise (Desmet et al. 2021) influence migration
patterns. These environmental changes might enhance migration when used as an adaptation
strategy or suppress migration when subgroups of vulnerable population cannot afford
outmigration in the future (Borderon et al. 2019, Cattaneo and Peri 2016; Hoffmann et al. 2020).
In the context of analyzing the effect of environmental change on societal outcomes,
migration has commonly been interpreted as a potential coping strategy to external shocks,
including weather shocks (Black et al. 2011a, b, Castells-Quintana et al. 2018). It is therefore
possible that migration is increasingly used as an adaptation strategy to climate change
(Gemenne and Blocher 2017, Kanta et al. 2018). Migration may also affect aggregate labor
productivity and lead to welfare gains for migrant households through relocation of labor from
less productive areas (e.g., rural hinterlands) to more productive locations (e.g., urban areas).
Likewise, remittances from earlier migrants as a diversified source of income can be used as a
means to mitigate and cope with climate shocks (Arezki and Brückner 2012) and may reduce
incentives for aspiring migrants to move. Changes in migration patterns, including those
driven by climate change, thus have substantial implications for future socioeconomic
development.
Migration dynamics interact strongly with other socioeconomic development dimensions.
Migration is not only a key component in global population dynamics (Cohen et al. 2008, Lutz
and KC 2010, Azose and Raftery 2015), but it also affects and is affected by economic
development. On the one hand, migration is shaped by economic development, which acts
both as a pull and push factor of labor mobility. On the other hand, international migrants bring
about socioeconomic changes in both origin and destination countries through remittances,
labor force participation, and its effect on economic growth (de Haas 2010, Hanson and
McIntosh 2016, Clemens and Pritchett 2008). Thus, changes in migration patterns can strongly
influence income levels and their distribution across and within countries. Likewise, migration
also contributes to shifts in carbon emission transfers (Liang et al. 2020; Qi and Li 2020)
through its contribution to population growth and changing energy consumption patterns.
Therefore, there is a need for projections of future socioeconomic development trajectories that
explicitly incorporate changes in migration patterns.
Given the potential effects that migration can have on well-being at the global level, a clear
understanding of interactions between international migration patterns and future environmen-
tal change appears particularly relevant for assessing current global policy options to combat
the negative effects of climate change. In order to anticipate societal challenges posed by
climate change, it is important to consider how the global climate system will evolve, as well
as the degree of vulnerability and capacity of societies to mitigate and adapt to future
environmental change. However, while climate modelling has witnessed major progress in
predicting global warming trends and their consequences on the biosphere, until recently only
humble efforts had been undertaken to design plausible future scenarios of socioeconomic and
human development (Lutz and Striessnig 2015). This imbalance partly owes to the high level
of uncertainty in the future development of various socioeconomic factors, rendering the
quantification of such scenarios particularly difficult.
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With the aim of exploring uncertainties in future environmental and societal change in a more
systematic manner, a number of qualitatively distinct scenarios have been developed in the
framework of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) fifth assessment report.
The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) represent five qualitative narratives of future global
development, and have proven to be useful tools to study heterogeneous futures in the context of
climate change research. They highlight five different combinations of challenges to climate change
mitigation and adaptation. Embedded in these narratives are assumptions on future international
migration. Some key socioeconomic variables have been quantitatively projected within the SSP
framework up to the year 2100. These include population by age and educational attainment at the
country level (KC and Lutz 2017) and by urban/rural characteristics at the 1/8° level (Jones and
O’Neill 2016), gross domestic product (GDP,Dellink et al. 2017, CrespoCuaresma 2017, Leimbach
et al. 2017), income inequality (Rao et al. 2019), final energy consumption, and greenhouse gas
emissions (Riahi et al. 2017, van Vuuren et al. 2017, Fricko et al. 2017, Fujimori et al. 2017, Calvin
et al. 2017, Kriegler et al. 2017). The population component reflects explicit pathway-specific
migration assumptions and is used as an input to all other components. On the other hand, migration
assumptions are only implicit in the other components for which quantitative projections exist. To
our knowledge, existing SSP quantification exercises are done separately for each socioeconomic
component and do not account for the possible interactions between the variables.
In this contribution, we exploit the framework provided by the SSP projections to quantify the
effects of international migration on future trajectories of GDP and between-countries income
inequality, as well as on the distribution of income within countries. We assess the role of migration
in future scenarios of development by comparing original projections to scenarios where zero
migration is assumed.We show thatmigration tends tomake theworld richer, on average, in all SSP
scenarios. Furthermore, the nature of migration and remittance corridors is significantly influenced
by the scenario of future development considered. Depending on the narrative and location, the
migration effect on income can be substantial, ranging from −5 to +21% at the continental level.
Moreover, we show that migration tends to make the world more equal in terms of income for all
SSP scenarios at all times, increases inequality in few origin countries, and reduces inequality in
most destination countries. Here as well, the scenario considered significantly affects the magnitude
of the migration effect on income inequality.
With this contribution, we do not aim to propose plausible predictions of future migration
under climate change, but rather to highlight where and to what extent migration plays a role in
projections of income and inequality that are widely used in climate change research. The
conceptual nature of the SSP framework implies that the projections are not meant to be
accurate predictions, but are instead internally consistent scenarios that do not integrate the
effects of climate change (see Riahi et al., 2017). The new set of projections developed here,
ensuring comparability with the original set of existing projections, is perfectly coherent with
the SSP’s interdisciplinary methodological framework. Our quantification of migration pat-
terns by SSP scenario presents a particularly useful addition to the pool of instruments aimed at
the assessment of global climate and migration policy options. In particular, our projections
without migration can be used as a consistent input of models combining explicit representa-
tions of migration, economic activity, and climate change (e.g., Benveniste et al. 2020).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the SSP framework and presents
the different scenarios used to describe future global developments. Section 3 describes the
methods we employ to quantify the role of migration flows in projections of population and
GDP. Section 4 presents the data employed. Section 5 discusses our resulting projections of
the explicit effect of migration. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
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2 Migration, GDP, and inequality in the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways
The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) offer five qualitative narratives of future global
development. They highlight different combinations of challenges to mitigation and adaptation
to climate change, structured into five scenarios. The first scenario, SSP1 (“Sustainability”),
describes a sustainable future, focused on strengthening well-being, where the world features
low inequalities and strong international cooperation. In this world, migration is assumed to
stay at medium levels, i.e., in line with historical patterns. The SSP2 (“Middle of the Road”)
scenario features a world where historical patterns and trends are assumed to persist in the
future in a context of political stability but with limited social cohesion. In this scenario,
migration is also assumed to stay at medium levels. SSP3 (“Regional Rivalry”) showcases a
fragmented world with regional conflicts occurring and a strong emphasis on security, in
particular on closed borders; in such a scenario for future developments, a low level of
migration is assumed. SSP4 (“Inequality”) assumes a highly unequal world, with strong
inequalities both across and within countries, and the emergence of a global elite. For this
scenario, migration is assumed to stay at medium levels. Note that the characteristics of
migrants (in terms of, for example, income levels or skills) in this scenario are quite different
from those of migrants in more optimistic scenarios such as SSP1 and SSP2. SSP4 assumes a
polarized education distribution with a subgroup of very highly educated population concen-
trating in member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), while the majority in the rest of the world have low education. Finally, SSP5
(“Fossil-fueled Development”) represents a future of strong resource-intensive technological
progress and economic growth, featuring a sustained use of competitive markets and wide-
spread globalization. In this world, migration is assumed to be high (Abel 2018b, KC and Lutz
2017). Appendix Fig. A2 (based on O’Neill et al. 2017) presents a graphical scheme
summarizing the combinations of challenges to adaptation and mitigation implied by each
SSP narrative, together with the assumptions concerning global migration for each scenario.
These narratives have been translated into quantified paths of population, GDP, and
inequality measures over the twenty-first century, but a differentiated assessment of the
contribution of migration has not yet been carried out hitherto in the existing literature. Such
an effort requires quantitative assessment of the effects of migration on population dynamics
across countries, and explicitly modelling how economic developments are expected to change
global migration corridors. Additionally, changes in remittances associated with such migra-
tion patterns and their projected effect on GDP per capita need to be incorporated into income
projections, and may also affect within-country income inequality. In the following section, we
present the methods employed to quantify the role of migration in each one of these variables.
3 Methods
3.1 Migration in SSP population projections
KC and Lutz (2017) provide population projections for the five narratives that constitute the
scenarios within the SSP framework. The five SSP narratives presented above provide
qualitative narratives on future global developments, which are translated to quantifications
of population trajectories at the country level by means of assumptions on the joint dynamics
of educational attainment, fertility, mortality, and migration. The SSP1 scenario rests on the
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assumption that investments in education and health lead to an acceleration of the demographic
transition worldwide. This translates to a low mortality and high education scenario, where
fertility is assumed to decrease in the developing world but not to decline further in developed
economies. The narrative associated to the SSP2 scenario corresponds to a middle-of-the-road
benchmark population trajectory, with medium fertility and mortality assumptions coupled
with a continuation of the trends in educational attainment observed historically. SSP3 is a
scenario of high population growth in the developing world and small changes in population in
industrialized economies. High mortality and low education improvement is assumed world-
wide, while fertility is assumed to remain low in the OECD countries and high in the rest of the
world. The SSP4 scenario is characterized by polarization, with persistent high fertility and
high mortality in high-fertility countries and low fertility and medium mortality in the rest of
the world. Finally, SSP5 builds upon high education and low mortality assumptions for all
countries, together with high fertility for industrialized countries and low fertility for all other
economies.
Migration assumptions are also included in the SSP scenarios. In the original population
projections by KC and Lutz (2017),1 the medium migration scenario (used in SSP1, SSP2, and
SSP4) assumes constant in-migration and out-migration rates for the coming century. The high
migration scenario (SSP5) essentially assumes that migration rates double by 2030 and then
remain constant, while the low migration scenario (SSP3) assumes that migration rates
converge to zero by 2030. In all scenarios, the number of people moving to another country
in any given 5-year period of the projection stays under 1% of global population. The overall
immigrant share in global population is depicted in Appendix Fig. A3 for the selected 5-year
periods.
Population projections under a zero migration assumption have also been developed in the
context of the update of SSP projections (Lutz et al. 2018).2 Some features of these new
counterfactual projections are discussed in Appendix Section A d) and illustrated in Appendix
Fig. A4. We use these population projections to develop new projections of GDP with zero
migration, explicitly quantifying the effect of migration dynamics on income differences in the
SSP projections.
3.2 Migration, remittances, and GDP in the SSP projections
Our adjustment of GDP is carried out making use of the GDP projections along the SSP
narratives developed by Dellink et al. (2017) as a starting point. Dellink et al. (2017) use an
aggregate production function specification where GDP is linked to population dynamics,
changes in total factor productivity, and physical and human capital accumulation, as well as
energy and fossil fuel resources. The effect of migration is included implicitly in these GDP
scenarios, as the original population projections are used as an input to construct them. We
construct counterfactual income projections under the zero migration assumption, correcting
the original projected income data by accounting for two effects of migration on GDP
dynamics. First, the change in country-level population affects GDP through the changed
population size. Second, remittances sent by migrants to their origin countries are also factored
1 We use version 2 of the SSP population projections, by the same authors. These latest projections are
forthcoming; a working paper is available in KC (2020). A description of the projection exercise can be found
in Lutz et al. (2018).
2 These are not yet publicly available, but can be obtained upon request from Samir KC.
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into GDP levels in the projection period. Incorporating these effects in GDP per capita
projections implies that the income variable including the effects of migration is given by3
GDPi;mig tð Þ ¼ GDPi;nomig tð Þ 1þ
popi;mig tð Þ−popi;nomig tð Þ
popi;nomig tð Þ
 !
þ remi tð Þ; ð1Þ




where popi(t) represents the population size of a given country at time t, GDPi(t) is the total
income, ypci(t) denotes per capita income, and remi(t) is the net remittance flow into the
country, while the subindices mig and nomig denote the scenarios with migration flows and
assuming zero migration, respectively.
Adjusting GDP figures for net remittance flows requires the estimation of bilateral migration
and remittance flows over the projection period. The original SSP population projections do not
provide explicit bilateral migration flows, although in- and out-migrant flows are implicitly
included in them. In order to obtain projections of flows of remittances, we use an estimated
gravity model (Jones and O’Neill 2013, Jones and O’Neill 2016) that summarizes the quanti-
tative effects of push and pull factors on migration flows. We consider two different specifi-
cations of our model, one for absolute migrant flows and another one for the share of migrants
from a given country in the origin population size. In this framework, the number of people
moving from one country to another is assumed to depend on population size (pop(t)) for the
specification in levels and the ratio of population densities (popdens(t)) for the specification in
ratios, economic opportunities, here measured as per capita income (ypc(t)), and the corre-
sponding ratio in the alternative specifications, as well as geographic proximity between the two
countries, here featured as the geodesic distance between capital cities (distij). We also include a
set of bilateral characteristics of the origin/destination pair summarized in the vector Λij , which
includes (a) an indicator variable measuring whether the two countries share a common official
language and (b) the share of migrant’s income sent as remittance and the cost of sending the
remittances, which proxy existing migrant networks as well as remittance costs and benefits.
We estimate bilateral migrant flows between countries i and j (moveij) as well as their ratios to
origin population (moveij/popi) by making use of gravity models specified as follows,
logmoveij tð Þ ¼ β0 þ β1logpopi tð Þ þ β2logpopj tð Þ þ β3logypci tð Þ þ β4logypcj tð Þ





¼ θ0 þ θ1log




ypc j tð Þ
ypci tð Þ
 
þ θ3logdistij þΨ Λij
þ νij tð Þ ð4Þ
3 Note that we abstract from modelling effects on GDP growth caused by differential productivity of migrants. In
addition, we work with the assumption that migration dynamics do not affect country-specific total factor
productivity dynamics (Ortega and Peri 2009). Equations (1) and (2) are thus identities that do not take into
account the potential effect of migration beyond the adjustment via remittances. Such an exercise goes beyond
the scope of our analysis here, but would be a fruitful avenue for future research.
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where εij and νij are error terms which fulfill the standard assumptions of the normal linear
regression model.
The parameters in Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) are estimated using data for the period 1990–2015
(see Section 4.1) and are used to obtain migration projections. The total number of migrants
leaving a given country at time t is given by leavei(t) = ∑j moveij(t), while the number of
immigrants is given by enterj(t) = ∑i moveij(t).
We ensure consistency with the original SSP population projections by rescaling the
bilateral flows derived from our gravity model, so that for each country the number of
immigrants over a given 5-year period equals that implied by the original population projec-
tions in each SSP narrative. We further compute a state variable (stockij(t)) that keeps count of
how many migrants from one region are present in another region at a given time. We assume
that only first-generation migrants send a share of their income back to their origin country in
the form of remittances for the duration of their life. This assumption coarsely illustrates
empirical findings of the migration literature focusing on second-generation remittances,
suggesting that second-generation migrants are significantly less likely to send remittances
back to their country of origin and send smaller amounts (Fokkema et al. 2013). This duration
is computed as life expectancy at birth (λi(t)) in the destination region (Wallace et al. 2019; Loi
and Hale 2019) minus median age of migrants at the time of migration (μi(t)),
stockij tð Þ ¼ stockij t−1ð Þ þ moveij tð Þ−1t>λ j tð Þ−μ j tð Þ enter j t−λ j tð Þ þ μ j tð Þ
 h i
ð5Þ
We derive remittance flows from bilateral migrant stocks by assuming that migrants send a
share τij(t) of their income to their origin region, for a cost ψij(t). We use this state variable to
calculate remittances received in a given country (remi(t)) at period t as
remi tð Þ ¼ ∑ jstockij tð Þypc j tð Þτ ij tð Þ 1−ψij tð Þ
 
−∑kstockki tð Þypci tð Þτki tð Þ 1−ψki tð Þð Þ ð6Þ
The calibration of the parameters in Eqs. (5) and (6) is described in detail in Section 4.2.
4 Data
4.1 Calibration of the migration gravity equation
We estimate the parameters in our gravity models (Eqs. (3) and (4)) using data on migration
flows between countries for 1990–2015 from Azose and Raftery (2019) as compiled in Abel
and Cohen (2019). In order to ensure robustness, we also estimate the parameters of the gravity
model using another dataset for the same period sourced from Abel (2018a). Both datasets on
migration flows are derived from data on migrant stocks from the World Bank using
demographic accounting methods. We use population data for the same period from the
Wittgenstein Centre (Lutz et al. 2019) and GDP per capita data from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators. We compute distances between countries as distances between their
respective capital cities. Our models are estimated based on 76,358 or 94,459 observations,
depending on the dataset used for bilateral migration flows. For the projection exercise, we use
the dataset from the Wittgenstein Center for population and the IIASA SSP database for GDP,
both of which are available for 2010–2100 in 5-year intervals.
Our parameter estimates for the bilateral migration models employed are presented in
Table 1. The estimates obtained by exploiting variation across countries and over time (that
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is, without origin and destination fixed effects, see column 1) imply that migration flows
between two countries increase with the origin population size and with the existence of a
common language, and decrease with the distance between countries, as suggested in other
studies using similar models (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008).4 Migration flows also tend to increase
with destination population size and per capita GDP. When including origin and destination
fixed effects (column 2), the inference is based on deviations of migration flows from origin-
and destination-specific averages and the direction of the effect of destination population size
and per capita GDP change and lose significance. For our alternative model with the migrant
ratio as a dependent variable, the coefficient for population density indicates that denser areas
tend to act as a pull factor, potentially due to higher productivity (coefficient without country
4 The importance of language proximity as a determinant of migration flows has been studied in detail by Adsera
and Pytlikova (2015), and the inclusion of covariates that account for such cultural similarities is commonplace in
gravity specifications for migration flows. Assessing the determinants of migration, Poprawe (2015) finds
common language to be a robust covariate using extreme bounds analysis methods.
Table 1 Results from OLS regression on migration flows (columns 1, 2, and 5 following Eq. 3) and migrants to
origin population ratios (columns 3 and 4 following Eq. 4). Specifications with year fixed effects (all columns),
and origin and destination fixed effects (columns 2 and 4). Estimates in columns 1–4 are obtained using data
from Azose and Raftery (2019) and Abel and Cohen (2019), while estimates in columns 5 are obtained based on
data from Abel (2018a). Standard errors clustered at the origin and destination levels are in parenthesis
Azose and Raftery (2019) Abel (2018a)
Migration flows Migrants ratio Migration flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Origin population 0.686*** 0.746** 0.575***
(0.040) (0.235) (0.031)
Destination population 0.681*** −0.748** 0.602***
(0.042) (0.235) (0.042)
Population densities ratio 0.037 −0.249
(0.071) (0.148)
Origin per capita GDP 0.428*** 0.155 0.105*
(0.059) (0.134) (0.044)
Destination per capita GDP 0.837*** −0.004 0.791***
(0.069) (0.097) (0.065)
Ratio of per capita GDP 0.145* −0.088
(0.072) (0.084)
Distance between countries −1.291*** −1.472*** −1.166*** −1.472*** −1.038***
(0.061) (0.062) (0.084) (0.062) (0.061)
Remittances as share of income 0.155* 0.190* −0.053 0.190* 0.090
(0.070) (0.077) (0.088) (0.077) (0.085)
Cost of sending remittances −9.418 −12.894 −10.532 −12.891 −15.333
(15.597) (15.027) (19.234) (15.030) (15.765)
Common official language 1.727*** 1.606*** 1.217*** 1.607*** 1.439***
(0.130) (0.128) (0.214) (0.128) (0.119)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin FE Yes Yes
Destination FE Yes Yes
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
N 76,358 76,358 76,358 76,358 94,459
R2 0.478 0.610 0.176 0.616 0.410
Within-R2 0.477 0.370 0.176 0.369 0.402
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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fixed effects positive in column 3), but are eventually subject to congestion effects (coefficient
with country fixed effects negative in column 4). Similarly, the coefficient attached to the ratio
of GDP per capita indicates that individuals tend to move to countries with higher incomes
(positive coefficient in column 3), but might require a minimum level of resources to be able to
move (positive coefficient in column 2 and negative in column 4). The effects of bilateral
characteristics (distance, remittance shares and costs, common official language) are similar in
sign, size, and level of significance in all specifications. Unsurprisingly, remittance costs reduce
migration, while the variable measuring remittances as a share of income has a positive effect on
migration, hinting at the effects of migration networks on the persistence of migration flows.
The interpretation of the model with country fixed effects differs from that of the model without
them, which explains the difference in the effects found across the two specifications. The inclusion
of origin and destination fixed effects implies that we are considering effects that are inferred from
deviations of migration flows from origin- and destination-specific long-run equilibria. The effects
obtained in these models can thus be thought of as summarizing short- to medium-term elasticities.
On the other hand, effects on changes in the long-term equilibria are factored into the parameter
estimates of themodel without the country fixed effects.We consider our model including only year
fixed effects to be the most appropriate for this projection exercise. In addition, projecting time-
invariant country fixed effects would lead to flow differences across countries remaining constant in
the long run, eventually hiding potential long-term effects of our socioeconomic covariates. We test
several combinations of fixed effects for robustness and show results including origin and
destination fixed effects in Appendix Section D. While some migration and remittance flows
differ, the overall conclusions are not qualitatively different. We provide a further robustness
check by estimating parameters using data from Abel (2018a) (see column 5) and find that our
projections are virtually not affected by the data source. We provide a final robustness check by
testing for reverse causality of migration on income at origin, in particular through remittances, by
using income minus remittances received as an independent variable (see Appendix Table S1); we
find that the coefficients are not affected.
4.2 Calibration of remittance parameters
The estimation of remittance flows is based on the assumption that only first-generation
migrants send remittances (assumed to be a constant share of their income), for the rest of
their lives after migration (Fokkema et al. 2013). Remaining lifetime duration is given by life
expectancy in the destination country minus the age of migrants at the time of migration.
While migrants do not necessarily have the same life expectancy as native-born populations,
the existing empirical literature shows that significant heterogeneity across ethnic groups and
origin countries exists (Singh and Miller 2004; Mehta et al. 2016). Mehta et al. (2016), for
instance, find that some groups (e.g., Asian-born) have higher life expectancy than the native
born in the USA, whereas migrants born in Central America, Europe, and Africa display
similar life expectancy. Although a systematic review and meta-analysis of empirical studies
by Aldridge et al. (2018) finds an overall mortality advantage among international migrants
compared with native populations, this evidence is limited only to high-income destination
countries and excludes marginalized subgroups of migrants. Given the reported heterogeneities
of migrants’ health status, we assume similar life expectancies of foreign-born populations to
those of the native-born, since migrants’ health outcomes and mortality patterns do tend to
converge to those of the natives’ as duration of stay increases (Wallace et al. 2019; Loi and
Hale 2019).
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For the estimation, we use the SSP projections of life expectancy available from the
Wittgenstein Centre for the period 1970–2100. Life expectancy values vary across countries
from 34.2 to 74.9 years in 1970, and span 58.7 to 92.2 years in the most pessimistic scenario
(SSP3) and 79.6 to 110 years in the most optimistic scenarios (SSP1 and SSP5) in 2100. To
calibrate the age of migrants at the time of migration, we proceed as follows. First, we use
immigration flows from the SSP population projections, available per 5-year age group. The
resulting age distribution of migrants at the time of migration is very similar across countries,
periods, and SSP narratives, thus ensuring consistency (KC and Lutz 2017). In particular,
approximately 17% of migrants are under 15 years old when migrating, 50% is between 15
and 30 years old, 24% is between 30 and 45 years old, and 9% above 45. Data on the initial
(current) stock of migrants by age group are derived using bilateral migrant stocks from the
World Bank for the year 2017. We apply an average of two age distributions in each
destination country to the current stocks data: the age distribution of migrants at the time of
migration in the period 2015–2020, and the age distribution of overall destination population
in the same period. Both are sourced from the SSP population projections (KC and Lutz 2017).
In Eq. (6), the share of income sent as remittances and costs are measured using data from
the World Bank for 2017. We maintain these constants over time and across the SSP
narratives, but we make them specific to each origin/destination pair. In order to calibrate
the share of income sent as remittances, we use bilateral remittance estimates, bilateral
estimates of migrant stocks, and per capita GDP data for 2017, the last year for which
information for all three variables are available. For each origin/destination pair with missing
data, we assign zero remittances. We assume the migrant’s income to be max(ypci(t)+ypcj (t)/
2, ypci(t)) and use it to compute τ(t). The range [0.0,0.28] covers the central 90% of the
estimates obtained, which implies that migrants in 90% of origin/destination pairs send
remittances amounting to between 0 and 28% of their yearly income. The cost of sending
remittances is calibrated using the total cost of transactions in percentage of GDP from the
Remittance Prices Worldwide database for 2017. For each origin/destination pair with missing
data, we use the mean cost of all available pairs. We obtain an overall 90% interval for
remittance costs of [0.02,0.12].
5 Results
5.1 Bilateral migration and remittance flows
We use the estimates from the gravity model given by Eq. (3) to generate projections of
bilateral migration flows between countries, which we rescale to SSP totals for the period
2015–2100 and for each one of the five SSP scenarios. We present these flows in the form of a
heat map aggregated at the continental level for 2095 in Appendix Fig. B1.
Independently of the scenario chosen, we find that migrants tend to move within continents,
as highlighted by the dark colors along the diagonal. Migration corridors from Africa to Asia
and Europe and from Latin America and the Caribbean to Northern America are also present in
the projected migration patterns. Migrant numbers increase from SSP1 to SSP2 and to SSP5 in
a similar fashion across migration corridors. For SSP4, bilateral migration patterns are slightly
different. As compared to other SSP scenarios, less intensive migration activity is observed
along certain corridors (e.g., within Africa), while others present more migrants (e.g., from
Asia to Europe). As expected, there is little effect of migration on population dynamics within
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the SSP3 scenario. When relating absolute migrant numbers to population sizes in origin
regions, we find that migration to Northern America from all continents apart from Asia is the
most significant one (while staying under 0.3% of the origin region population). The persis-
tence of a high share of migrants within Europe is not surprising given the historical patterns,
characterized by free mobility policy within a large part of the continent. When relating
absolute migrant numbers to the population size of destination regions, migration within
Northern America stands out, while migration from Asia to Oceania reaches significant levels.
Similarly, migrants as share of destination population stay under 0.3% worldwide.
We present the projected remittance flows aggregated at the continental level for 2095 in
Appendix Fig. B2. We find that most remittances are sent within continents, and remittance
corridors between Europe, Asia, and Africa, and from Northern America to Latin America and
the Caribbean can be recognized in the data, in line with the results for migration flows.
Remittances increase from SSP2 to SSP1 and to SSP5. The inversion between SSP1 and SSP2
in terms of the relative amounts of migrants and remittances in the Asia-Africa corridor is due
to both regions being richer yet less populated in SSP1 than in SSP2. For SSP4, bilateral
remittance patterns are somewhat different. Some corridors see less transfers relatively to other
SSP scenarios (e.g., within Africa), while some others present more transfers (e.g., from Latin
America to Asia). As expected, there is a relatively small flow of remittances in SSP3. When
relating absolute remittance amounts to GDP in receiving regions, we find that remittances
sent in the same corridors are the largest ones (although under 10% of GDP in the origin
region). When relating absolute remittance amount to sending region GDP, remittances sent
from Oceania, in particular to Asia, reach significant levels. Similarly, remittances as a share of
GDP in the destination location tend to stay under 10%.
5.2 GDP per capita projections for zero migration: global outlook
Based on our estimates obtained from Eq. (1), we produce country-specific projections of GDP
and GDP per capita for the period 2015–2100 for each of the five SSP narratives under the
assumption of zero migration. Our results at the global scale are illustrated in Fig. 1 (see
Section B in the Appendix for country-level projections). Figure 1 a shows average global per
capita GDP with (circles) and without (triangles) remittances, for the different SSP narratives.
While the effect of migration dynamics is visible in the data, it is moderate and does not
modify the ranking of income levels among the SSP narratives: SSP5 (“Fossil-fueled Devel-
opment”) is still the scenario with the consistently highest per capita GDP, and SSP3
(“Regional Rivalry”) is the one with the lowest.
Figure 1 b shows relative changes in average per capita GDP with migration compared to
our zero-migration projections, at the global level. We find that for all SSP scenarios, the
average global per capita GDP is consistently higher with migration than without. The effect
becomes substantial in the second half of the century for SSP4 (“Inequality”), where income
levels increase above 5% by 2065. Unsurprisingly, given the fact that the original SSP3
projections already include low migration levels, the effects are particularly small for this
scenario. For SSP1, SSP2, and SSP5, migration does not lead to further sizeable increases in
GDP per capita at the global level, stabilizing at a difference of 2–3% by the end of the
century. This stark contrast in the evolution of the migration effect on income levels is
influenced by the underlying assumptions concerning worldwide convergence of income
levels across the narratives. In an SSP4 world, dominated by global inequalities, strong
differences in per capita income between countries tend to persist all along the century.
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Migrants therefore have a strong incentive to move to richer countries, even in cases where the
desired destination is far away. The remittances sent will likely amount to a significant share of
their family income back home, thus contributing to an acceleration of income convergence
across countries. In such a world, international migration is highly beneficial from a global
income equalization perspective. On the other hand, in a strongly globalized world such as that
depicted by SSP1, SSP2, and SSP5, income disparities across countries are relatively small by
the end of the century. Migration will thus tend to take place, but mostly across countries
within a close distance, with a relatively similar GDP per capita to that of the origin economy.
Figure 1 c and d show relative changes in country-level per capita GDP and total GDP with
migration compared to our zero-migration projections for the “Middle of the Road” SSP2
scenario by 2100. We find that the extent and direction of the migration effect are highly
country-specific. In general, destination countries (see, for example, Canada or United Arab
Emirates) fare higher GDP levels with migration, as well as moderate changes in per capita
GDP (±10%), with the sign reflecting net remittances received (see Eq. (1)). This means that
some destination countries (e.g., Belgium, Jordan, or Lebanon) still receive net remittances,
since their emigrants move to relatively rich countries and send back considerable income. For
origin countries, the migration effect on GDP is less unidirectional. Some countries (e.g.,
Tajikistan, Serbia, or Nigeria) display higher income in the scenarios including migration, as
remittances received from significantly richer countries are able to compensate for the loss of
inhabitants contributing to the national economy. For the majority of origin countries (e.g.,



























































































































































Fig. 1 Income with and without migration, for all SSP narratives. a Average world per capita GDP, in 2005 US
dollars. b Average relative changes in per capita GDP with vs without migration (world). c Country-specific
relative changes in per capita GDP with vs. without migration for SSP2 (“Middle of the Road”) by 2100. d
Country-specific relative changes in GDP with vs without migration for SSP2 by 2100
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countries that are not rich enough to provide high remittances to the origin economy. In some
cases, origin countries are also net remittance–sending countries (e.g., Liberia, Sri Lanka,
Kazakhstan), as their emigrants move to areas that may present less favorable income
conditions than where their immigrants come from.
5.3 GDP per capita projections for zero migration: continental outlook
Figure 2 shows a decomposition of our GDP per capita projections at the continental level (see
Section A of the Appendix for a definition of the world regions used). The effect of migration
appears positive for Africa, Asia, and Oceania. In those regions, migration increases per capita
income for all SSP narratives over the century by up to 5%, 6%, and 21%, respectively.
Conversely, for Northern America and Europe, migration decreases per capita income by up to
1.4% and 5%, respectively, by the end of the century. This effect diminishes over time in
Northern America for SSP2, SSP3, and SSP5. Finally, for Latin America and the Caribbean,
while for a start migration contributes to increasing income levels for all SSP narratives, this
effect changes direction and migration ends up decreasing income levels by 1.5% for SSP1,
SSP2, and SSP4, and by 4% in 2100 for SSP5. Overall, the effect of migration on income
strongly depends on the particular SSP narrative considered.5
5.4 Migration effects on between-countries inequality
Our new GDP projections under the zero migration assumption allow us to address the role
that migration plays as a determinant of income inequality between countries. To that aim, we
use the global Gini coefficient, a commonly used measure of inequality, which considers the
population-weighted distribution of income between countries. We project the global Gini
coefficient based exclusively on between-countries inequality for all SSP narratives, both with
and without migration, using our population and GDP projections. We show results in Fig. 3.
Figure 3 a illustrates the global Gini coefficient with (circles) and without (triangles) migration,
for all SSP narratives. While the effect of migration dynamics is visible, it stays moderate and
does not modify the ranking of inequality levels among SSP narratives: SSP4 is still the
scenario with the consistently highest inequality, while SSP5 and then SSP1 from around 2080
are the least unequal.
Figure 3 b shows relative changes in between-countries Gini coefficients with migration,
compared to our zero-migration projections. We find that for all SSP narratives migration
makes the world consistently more equal in terms of cross-country income differences by up to
6% by the end of the century. For SSP2 and SSP4, the migration effect on between-countries
inequality stays between 1.5 and 3% for the whole century, while for SSP1 and SSP3 it
decreases to become zero by 2100. Conversely for SSP5, the migration effect intensifies after
2070 and reaches 6% by 2100. This substantial migration effect happens at a time when
inequality starts increasing again and migration limits this increase. This differential effect of
migration on inequality by the end of the century reflects the underlying hypotheses on
migration levels and on worldwide convergence of income levels across the narratives. In an
SSP5 world of global, strong, fossil-fueled economic growth, income levels are not
5 The projections include a correction for four countries where net remittances become larger than income levels
in the projection period. For these economies, we cap the ratio of net remittances to GDP once the projections
imply negative income levels.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 2 Per capita GDP with and without migration, for all SSP narratives, averaged for major world regions. Left
panel: Absolute values, in US dollars 2005 per capita per year. Right panel: Relative changes with vs. without
migration. From top to bottom: World regions considered, following KC and Lutz (2017): Africa (AFR), Asia
(ASIA), Europe (EUR), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Northern America (NOA), Oceania (OCE)
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substantially different across countries by 2100, but migration levels are still high. Our results
thus indicate that in general migration is expected to play a significant role in regulating
inequality between countries over the coming decades, and much more so in scenarios where
strong income differences persist.
5.5 Migration effects on within-country inequality
In order to obtain a more complete picture of the effect of migration on inequality, we also
assess its role as a determinant of inequality within countries. To that aim, we project within-
country Gini coefficients under a zero-migration assumption using the specification proposed
in Rao et al. (2019) (see Eq. (1) in their contribution) and compute changes in Gini stemming
exclusively from migration-driven changes in education drivers (education levels and share of
public spending), using their estimated coefficients (see Table 2 in Rao et al. (2019)). The
model used in Rao et al. (2019) is not a structural model that would allow us to quantify the
causal mechanisms underlying the interplay between education, income, and inequality
dynamics. However, it provides elasticities emanating from a reduced-form model which
has good in-sample fit and sensible out-of-sample projection paths for the inequality measure.
For our exercise, we employ the SSP population projections without migration, available with
detailed education levels. As in Rao et al. (2019), we also use data on educational attainment
levels by age and sex in 2010 from the Wittgenstein Center, as well as data on per capita
education spending from Statistics on Public Expenditures for Economic Development
(SPEED) (International Food Policy Research Institute, 2015). For the latter, we use regional
averages for countries with missing data. We show the projection results in Figs. 4 and 5.
Figure 4 depicts within-country Gini projections with and without migration for all SSP
narratives, aggregated at the world region level (continent-specific median and interquartile
range). The left column displays projections with migration by Rao et al. (2019). Unsurpris-
ingly, SSP3 (“Regional Rivalry”) and SSP4 (“Inequality”) present the starkest inequalities and
SSP1 (“Sustainability”) and SSP5 (“Fossil-fueled Development”) the lowest ones across
continents. Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa present the widest range of within-
country inequality measures. The middle column displays our projections without migration.
Looking at regional aggregates, migration appears to have little effect on within-country






































































































































Fig. 3 World inequality as measured by between-countries Gini coefficients, for all SSP narratives. a Absolute
Gini values with and without migration. b Relative changes in Gini coefficients comparing a scenario with
migration to that without migration
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column displays relative changes in Gini coefficients in scenarios with migration compared to
those without migration. We find that the effect of migration on within-country inequality
varies significantly depending on the country and the SSP narrative considered. The strongest
relative changes with migration happen for SSP5, which displays both the highest migration
activity and the lowest Gini coefficient values. In general, within-country inequality tends to
decrease with migration in Northern America and Europe and increase in Latin America and
the Caribbean and Africa, and displays moderate changes in both directions in Asia and
Oceania.
Figure 5 provides a more granular picture of the developments of income inequality within
countries by illustrating relative changes in Gini coefficients by 2100 for SSP2 (“Middle of the
Road”) for projections with and without migration. Countries in shades of blue present a
decrease in inequality with migration, while countries in shades of red present an increase.
Migration appears to have minimal effect on most large economies (USA, China, India, Brazil,
or Russia). Many destination countries (Canada, Australia, Western Europe, Saudi Arabia), on
the other hand, see their inequalities reduced with migration. For some origin countries (Mali,
Burkina Faso, Sudan, Afghanistan), migration appears to strongly increase inequality. Yet, for
most origin countries, the effect of migration stays limited to under 5% in either direction.
6 Discussion and conclusion
This study provides the first quantification of international migration effects on income
projections in the SSP framework. It highlights how migration effects strongly depend on
context, both in terms of the country and the narratives considered for projection. We show
that migration tends to make the world richer, on average, in all SSP scenarios. Furthermore,
the choice of narrative—that is, the scenario of future development considered—significantly
influences the nature of migration and remittance corridors. Depending on the narrative and
location, the migration effect on income can be substantial, from −5 to +21% at the continental
level. Finally, we derive migration effects on inequality both between and within countries.
We show that migration tends to make the world more equal in terms of between-countries
income differentials under all SSP scenarios, has little effect on within-country income
inequality in most major economies and origin countries, increases it in few origin countries,
and reduces inequalities in most destination countries.
Limitations of this study derive from the characteristics of the model and data employed. We
calibrate our gravity model to past and current data, but maintain the calibrated parameters constant
over time and across the SSP narratives, since those dimensions are not quantified in the original
SSP projections. Similarly, in our remittance model, we use current data for corridor-specific
calibration, but keep the calibrated parameters constant over time and across the narratives. More
importantly, we do not consider any heterogeneity of migrants or non-migrants within countries and
abstract from the effects of potential differentials in productivity between migrants and local
population. In fact, the socioeconomic characteristics of migrants tend to differ strongly across
countries, over time, and even for the same origin country (de Haas et al. 2019). To the extent that
brain drain may negatively affect productivity in the origin country and positively in the destination
country, the between-countries inequalities we project may actually represent a lower bound to the
actual effects of migration. Future research aimed at including such dimensions in our model should
help shed light on particular aspects of international migration dynamics (the role of skill mismatch,
for instance) in the projection exercises.
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In line with the conceptual framework around the SSP projections, our aim for developing
projections of various SSP components for zero migration is not to provide realistic forecasts of
future developments, but rather to offer quantifications of migration consistent with the qualitative
storyline for each SSP. Still, our analysis has direct policy implications. Despite its caveats, our study
strongly suggests that any one-size-fits-all approach to projecting future international migration in a
climate change context can be highly misleading, and conduce to misplaced policy answers. In such
differentiated circumstances, a scenario framework is helpful, perhaps even necessary, to think about
appropriate policy responses. Furthermore, our zero-migration projections fit perfectly in the
interdisciplinary methodological framework of the SSP, and offer consistency with the original
projections. This makes them particularly powerful to inform policymaking, in combination with
other existing projections, for instance of migration policies. Future research in the further develop-
ment of the SSPs or other similar frameworks could be enhanced by incorporating key aspects of the
findings presented here. Migration effects on income and inequality can be directly included in the
conceptualization of refined narratives, and our approach can be utilized to quantify such effects
endogenously for next-generation socioeconomic projections. The incorporation of this study’s
findings in such projections would have particular impact on quantifications of adaptive capacity in
relation to climate change scenarios, for example. Finally, including our projections as input
scenarios in a climate-economy model with explicit migration dynamics, with the aim of
Fig. 4 Within-country inequalities as measured by within-country Gini coefficients with and without migration,
for all SSP narratives. Median and interquartile range for major world regions. Left: Gini with migration. Center:
Gini without migration. Right: Relative changes with vs without migration. From top to bottom: Northern







Fig. 5 Within-country Gini coefficient. Country-specific relative changes without vs with migration for SSP2
(“Middle of the Road”) by the end of the century. Countries in shades of blue present an increase in Gini without
migration, thus a decrease in inequality with migration; countries in shades of red present an increase in
inequality with migration. Missing data for the following countries: Barbados, Brunei Darussalam, Djibouti,
Eritrea, Libya, Mauritania, Papua New Guinea, Uzbekistan
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investigating interactions between migration and climate policies, appears as a natural avenue of
further research.
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